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Teaching Art as Reasoned Perception:
Aesthetic Knowing in Theory and Practice
Richard Siegesmund
In his First Meditation, Descartes (1641/1951) posed the skeptical 
question of how is it possible to know anything that we perceive with our senses, 
because we may in fact be dreaming. He concluded that we cannot trust our 
perceptions, that we must regard sensory experience as false, for all that we 
perceive may only be a dream world of our own subjective creation. Such a 
skeptical view was by no means a new philosophical position at the time of 
Descartes, but Descartes’ reformulation of the skeptical argument has had an 
iconic power that has proved enduring. It leaves us with the idea that our 
perceptions, our senses, our feelings, are essentially untrustworthy. The 
information we gather through our senses is open to skeptical challenge, and we 
cannot make a claim for it as knowledge unless we can find another means of 
verification.
Cognition is defined as "the intellectual process by which knowledge is 
gained about perception and ideas" [Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary], Cognition is the process of coming to know. Cognition is not static.
It is a movement towards knowledge. While the end point of the cognitive 
process is knowledge, it is not where cognition begins. The process of cognition 
is a sorting out of information, the identification of what is pertinent, and 
categorization. The process includes also a manipulation of new information 
within the constraints of our previous knowledge. Cognition is an active, 
aggressive, act which fits an object into a subjective frame. Out of the process 
of cognition, we form beliefs regarding the validity of our knowledge.
Epistemology is the study and evaluation of our beliefs regarding what 
we hold to be valid knowledge. One of its concerns is the results of the cognitive 
process and examining the warrant for our beliefs in making those claims. 
Epistemology asks if claims to knowledge are trustworthy. Epistemology, with its 
concern for the outcomes of cognition, thereby has a legitimate claim to study, 
and evaluate the success of, the cognitive process itself.
By definition, perception is acknowledged as a part of the cognitive 
process, however, when we try to take a closer look at the role of perceiving and 
coming to know, the echoes of Descartes argument haunt us. The ghost is 
reflected in the W ebster's  definition--"knowledge...abouf perception." It is 
unclear where within the process of visual perception we can say how or when we 
have crossed a line into cognition. From an early age, the simple entertainment of 
illusionists teaches us that seeing is not always a reliable basis for believing. 
Therefore, as cognition is a process of coming to know, where in the cognitive 
progression does visual perception play an active role? Is all of perception a part 
of the cognitive process, or is only a portion of perception cognitive? Is 
perception simply a tool for assembling raw data which feeds more subtle and 
sophisticated mental operations? Is there a point where visual perception ceases
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to play an active role in cognition as higher order mental skills take over? In what 
sense is cognition greater than perception? In what ways was Descartes right? Or, 
can visual perception make a direct link to knowledge--is there an epistemological 
base to perception? Descartes would have us believe that knowledge is always 
an end product achieved through the mediation of other cognitive processes 
separate from perception. The question then becomes, while visual perception 
may be cognitive, through its contributions to the cognitive process, is it ever 
epistemological--do we ever know?
My research interest is in understanding art education as a field of inquiry 
where the problems of cognition, perceiving and knowing are explicitly engaged. 
My interests are grounded in theory, but my interests are not limited to the 
theoretical. I am interested in how art is taught, and how theory is realized in 
practice. I am interested in art classrooms, and I am interested in the real, daily 
work of art educators .
In my view, expert teaching in the arts is concerned with the developing 
the immediate experiential skills of perceiving. Perception is not simply the 
passive recognition of an image cast on a blank slate. Perception cannot be 
reduced to a photographic metaphor. Perception is an achievement of active 
intelligence requiring mental constructs permitting us to perceive (Dewey, 
1916/Hanson, 1958). Expert art teaching is engaged in a dynamic relationship of 
instructing students in knowing what they see directly and providing a intellectual 
and experiential knowledge base allowing them to see. This dialogue between 
seeing and knowing, which is played out in an arts classroom through a multitude 
of experiential moments, can be described as "reasoned perception."
Through this term, a combination of reason and perception, I pose a 
challenge to classical formulations of what reason is for, since Plato, sense and 
thought, mind and body are considered to be separate entities. Reasoned 
perception suggests, contrary to Descartes, we do come to know our world 
through perception. Learning to perceive is not mere enrichment. It is not 
ancillary. I would disagree with other researchers (Gardner, 1983; Davis and 
Gardner, 1992) in attributing perception as an affect of a separate intelligence.
It is a fundamental and basic part of cognition.
I do not believe there is anything particularly new about "reasoned 
perception." I believe it is the way many expert art teachers have taught for years. 
What may be new, or at least worth restating, is suggesting this instruction, based 
in the discipline of art, makes a legitimate and important contribution to cognition. 
Such a reconceptualization of the paradigm of cognition, may have specific and 
significant impact for the perception of the role of the arts within the overall school 
curricula.
It is important to note that in referring to art education both as a discipline 
and as a field of inquiry, my research question is consciously placed within a 
particular historical debate concerning the structure of an art curriculum (Barkan,
1966). While "reasoned perception" gives credit to the experiential nature of art 
education, there is also the suggestion that within art education there are specific
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bodies of knowledge to be mastered. Schwab (1969a) described these as 
"fields of systematic intellectual activity" (p. 2). In Schwab's view, each academic 
discipline represented a discrete approach, utilizing specific tools, to intellectual 
inquiry. I suggest whether it be the understanding of the components and 
interrelations of a color wheel, the experience of the explosion of concentrated 
watercolor pigment on a piece of water saturated paper, the historical awareness 
of specific artists who have sustained over time an interest in particular kinds of 
aesthetic problems, or the knowledge of a specific vocabulary within our 
language that can be utilized to explore and understand expressive form, these 
are all elements of a particular body of knowledge and are all significant 
components in the teaching of the discipline of art. This is how Bruner's 
(1960/1977) reference to "the teaching and learning of structure" (p. 12) within a 
subject area pertains to art education. Therefore, expert teaching in the arts is 
informed with a experiential knowledge of the structure of the discipline itself--not 
simply a structure of a lesson plan with precisely coordinated procedures, 
objectives and rubrics for assessment. Reasoned perception is firmly grounded 
in experiential ideas of discipline, structure and inquiry.
Reasoned perception
Reasoned perception is an ancient idea traceable back to the original 
Greek concept of Logos, the fundamental controlling principles of the universe. 
Marcuse (1955) suggests Logos’ original meaning was much broader than our 
contemporary understanding which associates the word with reason. Logos 
originally refers to a fully realized self-aware state of being. Logos is an ontological 
condition. A part of Logos was aisthanesthai-tUe ability to perceive. 
Aisthanesthai is the root for the English word aesthetics. To pursue the 
etymology further, within the Greek language, verbs are conjugated in one of 
three ways: 1) as an action that an individual initiates, 2) as an action that is done 
to an individual, or 3) an action that is simultaneously both initiated and incurred. 
Aisthanesthai is conjugated in the third fashion, thus creating a meaning that 
reflects a dynamic state between subject and object with each effecting (not 
simply affecting) the other. Therefore, it can be argued Logos originally 
incorporated the capacity to appreciate the sense of qualities and distinctions of 
an object within the subject's perception. Moreover, appreciation was an action 
which required active mental engagement by the viewer in the process of 
observing an object which possessed its own tangible presence independent of 
the viewer.
Plato, however, argued that Logos should properly be seen as utilization 
of logic over base instincts (his pejorative term for perception). The privileged 
place Plato assigned to logic initiated a distinction between mind and body. Later, 
Aristotle contended that Logos is rationality, thereby solidifying the mind-body 
distinction. Thereafter in Western thought, from Aristotle to Hegel, and into the 
present day, reason is a struggle of mind over sense.
Reasoned perception seeks to reverse this Western historical trend and 
reclaim a role for the senses in the exercise of rationality, thereby recapturing a 
pre-Aristotelian concept of Logos. Reasoned perception does not reject the
Siegesmund: Teaching Art as Reasoned Perception
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mzwp/vol14/iss1/22
DOI: 10.17077/2326-7070.1319
achievements of rationality. On the contrary, it seeks to incorporate them into a 
new paradigm that attempts to overcome the mind/body dualism.
Despite the dominance of the mind/body dualism in Western 
philosophical thought, reasoned perception has been, and continues to be, a 
continuing philosophical concern. For example, one of the abiding themes in the 
philosophical work of Immanuel Kant (1929/1965) is the relationship of the 
individual to objects existing in an external world. In the Critique of Pure 
Reason (1787/1965), Kant's concept of anschauung, deals with the 
phenomenon of our apprehension of physical entities having an objective reality 
yet are simultaneously created by our perception of them. Kant did not consider 
this to be aesthetic since the process of conceptualization -cognition--was 
engaged in this experience. In the Critique of Judgment (1790/1987, Kant 
suggested aesthetic experience occurred by our perception of objects which by 
their nature possessed no attributes, no concepts, by which they could be 
conceptually categorized, thereby triggering the free play of the imagination, and 
resulting \n~requiring~a reconstruction of our conceptual categories.
Continuing into the 20th century, from Martin Heidegger (1971) and 
Theodore Adorno (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944/1994) in Germany to John 
Dewey (1916, 1929/1988, 1934/1989) and Maxine Greene (1995) in America, 
there is a concern to expand what counts within epistemology while preserving 
the accomplishments of the rationalist tradition. Dewey (1929/1988) suggested 
that knowledge existed only in relationship to objects, not as fixed meanings that 
could exist outside of time and space. He observes that "physical time designates 
a relation of events, not the inherent property of objects." (p. 116). In Art as 
Experience(1934/1989), he spoke to the qualities of those relationships as 
contributing to cognition:
To think effectively in terms of relations of qualities is as severe a 
demand upon thought as to think in terms of symbols, verbal and 
mathematical. Indeed, since words are easily manipulated in mechanical 
ways, the production of a work of genuine art probably demands more 
intelligence than does most of the so-called thinking that goes on 
among those who pride themselves on being "intellectuals." (p. 52)
The Gestalt psychologist Rudolph Arnheim (1969) is similarly concerned with 
these experiential qualities of relationships. He suggests that our perceptual 
experience is not antecedent to cognition, nor does perception merely supply 
the data which other cognition mechanisms process, but that perception itself is a 
cognitive act:
cognitive operations called thinking are not the privilege of 
mental processes above and beyond perception but the essential 
ingredients of perception itself. I am referring to such operations as active 
exploration, selection, grasping of essentials, simplification, abstraction, 
analysis and synthesis, completion, correction, comparison, problem 
solving, as well as combining, separating, putting in context. These 
operations are not the prerogative of anyone mental function....There is
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no basic difference in this respect between what happens when a person 
looks at the world directly and when he sits with his eyes closed and 
"thinks." (p. 13)
Gestalt experiences are rich, complex, and not transparently knowable or 
describable in clear propositional terms. Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest 
metaphors are records of experiential gestalts. Each gestalt is a framework with 
which to see, a grid on which we can construct our own knowledge- an empirical 
grid woven from experience. Our perceptual world is key to our experiential world 
which we name and quantify. Perceiving itself is an act of differentiation. We need 
the grid to construct meaning in it provides a frame for selecting qualities out of 
undistinguished commonalty. The construction of knowledge, or more accurately 
the re-construction of knowledge from discriminating perception is a process of 
re-collecting and recombining. We reconstruct our metaphors into meaning.
Working out of the Gestalt tradition, cognitive psychologists (Spelke. E., 
Gutheil, G. and Van de Walle, G, 1996) have done extensive tests with infants 
to understand what infants can learn through perception before they have 
developed the cognitive capacity to categorize and classify. Their work shows the 
making of meaning is not a merely linguistic construction of connecting referent 
to symbol. Our ability to build meaning from experiential gestalts is present at 
birth.
The work of these philosophers, psychologists, linguists and 
neuroscienctists are all part of a substantial historical project to mend the stark 
separation of traditional epistemology which sought to separate mind from body 
through ontology, the science of being. It seeks not to see things as separate, 
but understand them as existing in relationships. There is a new appreciation, 
discovery -a  contemporary re-collection--of logos. Within this project, art 
education has a role in this project as a process of training the eye to differentiate, 
of learning to make reasoned judgments, and being aware of criteria on which 
those judgments are based to the end of creating personal frameworks on which 
we build individual meaning.
Theory and Classrooms
As I stated at the beginning of this paper, my interest in art education is 
not simply theory driven. Theory plays a role in the structure of curriculum, but 
curriculum is profoundly shaped by pedagogy. Consequently, my concern 
extends to what happens in a classroom led by expert practitioners. In my 
research, I seek to identify examples of purposeful teaching of reasoned 
perception. Purposeful teaching is categorized by Shulman's (1986) as the 
skillful implementation of three forms of knowledge which inform the craft of 
teaching: "knowledge of rules of principles, knowledge of particular cases, and 
knowledge of ways to apply appropriate rules to properly discerned cases." (p.
31) Shulman suggests, beyond the content of the discipline, expert teaching 
involves a dynamic interaction between teacher and student. Expert teaching 
incorporates adopting appropriate pedagogical moves (Shulman's “principles") to 
knowledge of students (Shulman's "particular cases”). Such expertise, is a
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prerequisite to the ability to teach a discipline. Consequently, purposeful art 
educators who teach utilizing reasoned perception would be able to articulate a 
strong theoretical foundation for their teaching and demonstrate in their 
classroom practice a wide repertoire in applying "appropriate rules to properly 
discerned cases.''
Traditionally, much of the assessment, for both students and teachers, of 
what goes on in an art class, centers on an evaluation of the objects that are 
produced. My research is less concerned with objects and is more concerned 
with teaching and learning in a dynamic creative environment. As a part of this 
interest, I want to look at how students engage the creative process in their work; 
however, I want to carefully separate this concern from an investigation into 
products-particularly the aesthetic valuing of artistic objects. In doing so, I do not 
mean to suggest the products of arts education, and aesthetic valuing, are 
unimportant; however, I believe the aesthetic valuing of finished products as a 
principle form of student assessment is not a primary concern of teaching art as 
reasoned perception.
As I am choosing not to use aesthetic valuing of artistic objects as lens for 
looking at art classes, how then will I recognize an exemplar classroom? What is 
the content that would categorize an arts classroom where reasoned perception 
is taught? What is pedagogical environment where that content would be 
delivered? Green (1983) describes classroom as communicative environments. 
Although Green was articulating a linguistic perspective on research, her method, 
with it emphasis on dynamic constructed activities, captures the feel of creative 
process which is valued in art education:
From this perspective, events evolve during interactions as teachers 
and students work together to meet instructional goals. Therefore, 
classroom events...are dynamic activities constructed by teachers and 
students as they process, build on, and work with both their own and 
the others' messages and behaviors, (p. 357)
Although this environment may be dynamic, it would be a mistake, especially in an 
art education context, to consider it arbitrary. Gage (1978) and Schwab (1983) 
suggest an educationally constructive, interactive process is structured by rules. I 
suggest these models can be applied to an arts classroom concerned with 
creative process. Creative process is purposeful and directed. As Schwab 
observes:
Every art, whether it be teaching, stone carving or judicial control of a 
court of law...has rules, but knowledge of the rules does not make one an artist. 
Art arises as the knower of the rules learns to apply them appropriately to the 
particular case. Application, in turn, require acute awareness of the particularities 
of that case and ways in which the rule can be modified to fit the case without 
complete abrogation of the rule. In art, the form must be adapted to the matter. 
Hence the form must be communicated in ways which illuminate its possibilities 
for modification, (p. 265)
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For Schwab, expert teaching is governed not simply by pedagogical 
rules, but rules that arise out of the discipline itself. Schwab (1969a, 1969b) 
suggests teaching and learning as structured forms of inquiry within disciplines.
In appealing to the knowledge of a discipline, there is an explicit suggestion that 
there are certain kinds of knowledge. In effect, there are territories of knowledge. 
Each territory has a contribution to make to our understanding. Schwab describes 
"fields of systematic intellectual activity (1969a, p. 2)." There are bounded fields, 
and within each field there is a particular kind of knowledge that is worth knowing. 
By the use of words like systematic and structure, it is suggested these are fields 
best explored with guidance. Teaching, therefore, is an introduction to the 
conventions and structures of each field.
The Structure of Practice
Schwab proposes a specific procedure for teaching the structure of 
inquiry within a field of knowledge. He calls the process of this inquiry "reflexive 
scrutiny." (1969b p. 65) and offers a description of this process as the "means by 
which to identify and segregate the appropriate and inappropriate and to show 
that they are the one or the other." But this is not simply a process of naming and 
categorization. Schwab speaks to the need of the students to experience the 
discipline (p. 51). To know the subject matter is not enough. Schwab suggests 
while the experience of a discipline can only be learned through intimate 
knowledge of the structure of a discipline itself, that experience can only be 
achieved by avoiding a "rhetoric of conclusions." (p. 52). Schwab claims through 
his method of enquiry not just knowledge of the data within a discipline is 
achieved, but the ontological relation, an experience, of the discipline is achieved 
as well.
Schwab contends enquiry is a process of conceiving a problem, planning a 
specific approach towards dealing with the problem and then marshaling and 
examining the data pertinent to the approach. The products of enquiry, the object 
created -what would commonly be called the conclusions-- are not uninteresting, 
but they cannot become rhetorical endgames. These condusions-these objects- 
"will not appear alone and unchallenged." (p.52) In fact, "in many instances, they 
will be members of a pair or a trio of enquiries, treating a similar subject matter in 
different terms, posing different problems, seeking different data and argument." 
(p. 52) The concept of teaching is not as direct transmission of facts and figures 
which are poured into empty vessels, towards the end of reinforcing a 
predetermined set of conclusions, but a process through which "the sense and 
soundness of materials are dealt with by students and instructor in concert." (p.53)
Following Schwab's "Arts of Recovery", I suggest there are six ways 
(rules) in which teaching for reasoned perception can be identified in an arts 
classroom:
1) Students are directed to observe their world and assemble specific 
observations through the use of particular visual media.
2) There is an emphasis of process over product. Products produced
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through the assemblage of observations are not presented as autonomous 
objects for aesthetic enjoyment, rather they are presented as embodiments of 
ideas to be shaped, focused and sharpened. It is the process of embodying 
ideas which interests the practitioner of reasoned perception, not a traditional 
aesthetic appreciation of an object or a performance.
3) An arts class emphasizing an open exchange of ideas about art. Within 
reasoned perception there is an expectation works of art or performances were 
motivated by an idea. This idea was distinctly embodied in the medium in which 
the artist or the performer chose for their expression. Although the idea does not 
possess a precise direct referent in language, reasoned perception suggests 
both the artist and the audience can meaningful discuss the ideas the work of art 
is dealing with. Most importantly, the creator of the work of art can consciously 
embody an idea in a work of art--a symbolic art. This idea is not allegorical. It has a 
direct meaning in itself; yet it is the product of the creator.
4) Not only is it possible to use language to explore ideas underlying 
works of art and performances, there is an expectation language and discourse 
are appropriate tools for increasing our understanding of the ideas embodied in 
art. This discourse enhances our capacity to use the arts in the expression of our 
own ideas. This means significant portions of class time are dedicated to student 
discussion.
5) Works of art and performances have structures which can be analyzed 
and compared. Out of this analysis, judgments can be made. Reasons can be 
offered to support such judgments.
6) To understand works of art requires attention to perceptual detail. 
Works of art and artistic performance require consideration of the unexpected 
and the unknown. They present the possibility of conceiving the world in a 
different paradigm. The arts pose the potential of seeing the world through new 
lenses. Therefore students must be trained to perceive the unexpected, ground 
their inquiry in detail, and avoid generalizations. Attention to perceptual detail 
leads back to the assemblage of specific observations and so creates a natural 
loop of discourse and growth.
For Schwab, the rules can only be implemented by a teacher knows a 
discipline "through and through." Schwab defines this as having the "syntax, 
vocabulary, and organization appropriate to the meaning [the materials of the 
class] are to convey." (1969b, p.52) Furthermore, this enquiry must be guided by 
an alert sensitivity to what each student says and does. Most importantly to 
maintain the dynamic of enquiry, "the instructor's aim must be, as far as possible 
and especially in the beginning, to 'honor' each student response." (p. 67)
The Passion and Concern of the Discipline
Teaching is more than multiple sets of pedagogical moves specific to a 
discipline and fully translatable to a lesson plan. Teaching requires a pedagogical 
means of finding an embodiment to the passion of a discipline. The embodiment
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of the passion of the discipline is a much more vivid description than knowing a 
discipline through and through, although I don't believe this distorts Schwab's 
meaning. Passion speaks to the experiential character of knowledge that is more 
than simply knowing but extends to caring about content of the discipline.
Teaching would then require a particular kind of passion to explore a field 
of inquiry. Passion suggests the process of dealing with the sense and 
soundness of content is not a detached, abstract task of demarcating a territory, 
but there is a physical and emotional quality to inquiry. Knowledge requires the 
embodiment of the sensory experience of inquiry. There is a physical 
sensuousness in our moving in a particular intellectual territory. The teacher 
embodies the passion, the sensuality, of the discipline, models it and allows the 
opening where this passion can be experienced by students. In so doing, the 
students, if they want, can make this passion their own. Passion, the 
sensuousness of teaching, is not limited to the experiential encounter with the 
disciple but is part of the interaction between teacher and student. Passion lies 
at the heart of the moment of transfer of knowledge. My research would be 
particularly interested in looking for these occurrences of teaching which invite 
and engage the student in experiential moments, and entered through the act of 
perception. Experiential moments are those engaging both the mind and the 
body.
Besides the embodiment of knowledge, Schwab speaks of good 
teaching as engaging and honoring students. There is a responsibility of the 
teacher to be concerned with the integrity of the subject matter itself, to be 
connected to a field of ideas, and to care enough for their students so they have 
an opportunity to connect with this concern as well. Maxine Greene (1995) has 
suggested, teachers need to recognize that epistemology goes beyond naming 
and embraces caring and concern. Therefore, a classroom where art is taught as 
reasoned perception would show sensory experience is a part of the content, 
and the feelings of students an integral component pedagogical concern.
Conclusion
My research can be broken down into two broad concerns: 1) an 
explication of the concept of reasoned perception, and 2) an analysis of how art 
is taught as reasoned perception, limited to a set of specific cases. Most 
importantly, I am concerned with the content of teaching. To do this, I want to be 
in classrooms and watch exemplar teachers teaching. In those classroom, I do not 
wish to be simply an ethnographic reporter because I am equally concerned with 
issues of worth. I want to do more than accurately record what is happening; I also 
want to reflect upon the intentions of the teachers and the worth of what is being 
taught. Why have particular teachers chosen to teach the arts in a particular 
manner? What is it they hope to teach? With this perspective I would compare 
how it is these teachers actually appear to teach, and what it is that students 
appear to learn.
In such classrooms, expert art educators address on a daily basis 
Descartes' skeptical question of how is it possible to know anything that we
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perceive with our senses. It is the challenge expert art educators confront in each 
of their classroom for art education is a field of inquiry in which the tools of the 
discipline are experiential feelings and sensory concepts. In response to 
Descartes, when art education is purposefully taught, with passion and concern- 
as reasoned perception--it can provides students insight into exquisitely varied 
forms of artistic representation providing us access to Descartes ultimate goal: 
knowledge of our world.
R eferences
Arnheim, R. (1969). Visual thinking. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Barkan, M (1966). Curriculum problems in art education. In E. Mattil (Director),
A seminar in art education for research and development
(USOE Cooperative Research Project No. V-022) (pp. 240-255).
University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University.
Bruner, J. (1977). The process of education. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. (Original work published 1960).
Davis, J & Gardner. H. (1992). The cognitive revolution: Consequences for the 
understanding and education of the child as artist. In B. Reimer and 
R.A. Smith (Eds.) The arts, education, and aesthetic knowing,
(pp. 92-123). Chicago, IL: National Society for the Study of Education.
Descartes, R. (1951). Meditations on first philosophy (L. J. Lafieur, Trans ). 
New York: Macmillan. (Original work published 1641).
Dewey. J (1916). Democracy and education. New York: The Free Press.
Dewey, J. (1988). The quest for certainty. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press. (Original work published 1929).
Dewey, J. (1989). Art as experience. Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois 
University Press. (Original work published 1934).
Gage, N. (1978). The scientific basis of the art of teaching. Chicago: 
Rand McNally.
Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind. New York: Basic Books.
Green, J. (1983). Teaching and learning: A linguistic perspective. Elem entary  
School Journal, 83(4), 353-391.
Greene, M. (1995). What counts as Philosophy of education. In Konli, W. (Ed.) 
Critical conversations in philosophy of education. New York: 
Routledge.
Marilyn Zurmuehlen Working Papers in Art Education, Vol. 14 [1997], Art. 22
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mzwp/vol14/iss1/22
DOI: 10.17077/2326-7070.1319
Hanson, N. R. (1958). Patterns of discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Heidegger, M. (1971). Poetry, language, thought (A. Hofstadter, Trans.). 
New York: Harper & Row.
Horkheimer, M and Adorno, T (1994). Dialectic of enlightenment. New York: 
Continuum. (Original work published 1944).
Kant, I. (1965). Critique of pure reason (N. K. Smith, Tans.). New York: 
Macmillan. (Original work published 1787).
Kant, I. (1987). Critique of judgment (W. Pluhar, Trans.).Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett. (Original work published 1790).
Lakoff, G. and Johnson, M (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
Marcuse, H. (1955). Eros and civilization. Boston: Beacon Press.
Schwab, J. (1969a). The practical: A language for curriculum. School Review,
7 8(5).
Schwab, J. (1969b). College curriculum and student protest. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Schwab, J. (1983). The practical 4: Something for curriculum professors to do. 
Curriculum inquiry, 13(3), 239-265.
Shulman, L. (1986). Paradigms and research programs in the study of teaching:
A contemporary perspective. In Wittrock, M.C. (Ed.) Handbook of 
Research on Teaching, Third Edition. New York: Macmillan.
Spelke, E., Gutheil, G. and Van de Walle, G (1996). The development of object 
perception. In S. Kosslyn and D. Osherson (Eds.), Visual cognition: An 
invitation to cognitive science, Second Edition (pp. 297-330). 
Cambridge, MA:The MIT Press
Siegesmund: Teaching Art as Reasoned Perception
https://ir.uiowa.edu/mzwp/vol14/iss1/22
DOI: 10.17077/2326-7070.1319
